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Questioning de Soto: The Case of Uganda
ABSTRACT
The 1995 Constitution vested land in the citizens of Uganda.
Accordingly, in 1998, Parliament passed a law to re-regulate the
myriad land relations accreted from past and contemporary de jure
laws and de facto practices. The Land Act of 1998 manifests 100 years
of contest over land and governance in Uganda; a contest made
contemporary by Hernando de Soto’s (2000) book, The Mystery of
Capital: Why Capitalism Triumphs in the West and Fails Everywhere Else.
This paper argues that governmentalities associated with land law
articulate an enduring teleology of development in which land has
always been crucial. In sustaining the transition from a past
“tradition” to a “modern” future, an equivalence is constantly created
and reaffirmed with what “is” and what “ought to be.” Imprisoned
by the normative dualisms of past and future, is and ought, tradition
and modern, orthodox discourse about land distorts “here and now”
lived realities. Uganda’s route to formalization underscores an
evolving process whereby the Land Act of 1998 affirmed what was
inevitable. Yet implementation is proving slow and difficult.
RAEWYN ISABEL PORTER*
INTRODUCTION
The paper draws on research undertaken in Uganda between
1997 and 2000 to examine current claims for formalization of the
land and housing assets of the poor recently popularized by
Hernando de Soto. De Soto stresses that fixed, established, secure
* The author holds a Ph.D. from the Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology (RMITU) in
Melbourne, Australia. Her Ph.D. dissertation entitled “100 Years of Contest: Land and
Governance in Uganda” where this article was based builds on her 15 years of research,
advocacy and policy practice with land, housing and public sector reform and social
policy issues.property rights and contract enforcement can turn the “dead
capital” of the poor into economic growth capital. He argues that
the informal property arrangements of the poor ensure that they
remain poor. Since they hold their assets in defective forms, the
poor cannot transform them into working capital as Western
owners do when they represent legally owned property as collateral
for loans. Readers may wonder why and how this is relevant in a
Philippine setting and in this journal. The relevance is due to the
popularity of De Soto’s work in the Philippines and President Gloria
Arroyo Macapagal’s announcement (Philippine Daily Inquirer, 24
November 2001) that she is setting up a committee to determine
how his principles may be applied in the Philippines.
I argue that contemporary experience in Uganda must be
understood as the accretion of historical contests between the
actions of the state (variously, Buganda Lukiiko [Buganda
Parliament], Protectorate administration, various post-
independence nation states) and the “everyday people” (variously,
owners, tenants, squatters, land occupants) through which both
de jure and de facto regimes of land access are created, negotiated,
and sustained. This proposition contrasts with much academic
discourse that depends on the creation of a difference that
misconstrues actually evolving relations of access. Official discourse
understands the present in terms of a teleological transition, from
a past (tradition) to a future (modern), in people’s relations to land.
In this conception of land access, tradition is seen as the past,
whereas the modern is taken for granted as the future, and is
automatically considered what “ought” to be. The transit from
one state to another is inexorable, because all rich societies have
modern systems of tenure, whereas poor societies have, by
definition, traditional relations between people and land. This
teleology reinforces a tendency to over-play, to overdetermine, the
role of “structural imperatives” (such as regulatory regimes
introduced by the state) in determining land access, at the expense
of local agency to hybridize tradition and modernity for local
advantage. In other words, this profoundly distorts the lived
PHILIPPINE JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT 206experience I observed in Kampala as a result of my examination of
the past. But it does more than that, for these conceptions are today
backed by the persuasive and coercive powers of international
agreements that reinforce orthodoxy and, in an aid-dependent
economy and polity like Uganda, point to equally important ethical
and political shortcomings as well. The following story illustrates
my point. It emanates from de Soto’s book and is my paraphrased
version of what appeared in The Economist, March 31–April 6 2002,
under the banner story, “No title.”
“NO TITLE”
People in poor countries have assets—lots of them. But
because they rarely have formal titles, they cannot use these
assets as collateral to raise cash. In a typical African country,
barely one person in ten lives in a formal house, and only one
worker in ten holds a formal job. While leaders of poor countries
beg the rich world for aid and prostrate themselves before
potential foreign investors, they fail to realize that there is a
much larger potential source of funds at home. There are trillions
of dollars all ready to be put to use.
Grace and John need 20,000 Malawian Kwacha to expand
their goat-slaughtering business. They have assets of 25,000
Kwacha held in a bungalow they built on a plot of “customary
land.” That is, the plot’s previous owners had no formal title
over the land; it was simply part of a field that the family had
cultivated for generations and then sold to new urban dwellers.
Surely they could borrow the money using the house as security?
No, because they cannot prove that they own it. John and Grace
have a contract signed by the local chief, but no bank will accept
it as collateral because it is not enforceable in a court of law.
Rather, it is an expression of traditional law, which is usually
unwritten, unpredictable, and dependent on the chief’s whim.
So the house is dead capital; they own it but cannot make its
value work for them.
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rights, accessible to more or less all citizens. No poor country
has. Better property laws are not the only reason that some
countries are richer than others, but they clearly make a
difference. Many poor countries, recognizing this, are trying to
devise ways to make their property systems more inclusive. But
the hurdles are high. Lawyers often oppose attempts to simplify
the law. Tribal chiefs resist changes that may reduce their power.
People who live in traditional rural communities are often wary
of alien ways of doing things. Poor countries’ efforts at reforming
property laws have rarely succeeded. In every poor village,
anywhere in the world, people know exactly who owns what.
The challenge for governments in poor countries is to take that
information and form it into a clear and enforceable set of laws.
The alternative is to stay poor.
What does the author of “No title” ask us to take at face value?
How is the idealized what “ought to be” constructed against a
presumed what “is”? Firstly, it asserts that leaders of poor countries
have no agency; they are inactive; and they are as poor in intellect
as their countries are in wealth. They “fail” to see what is obvious
to the rich countries (i.e., that there is plenty of wealth right under
their noses). Instead, they “beg” and “prostrate themselves” for
aid and investment. Secondly, it states that aid and the benefits of
investment flow only downward—that there is no self-interest in
the rich countries lending and/or investing in poor countries. It
ignores claims that now, more than ever in capitalist history, the
profits from finance capital are made from debt and exponential
debt creation that requires circulation of money rather than old-
fashioned economic function (Hoogvelt 1997).
Let us examine the following assertions of the author.
“There are trillions of dollars all ready to be put to use.”
The presumption is that outside of the globalized capitalist
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held by the poor have no use, no secondary purpose. This is far
from the reality of Kampala’s urban and peri-urban dwellers at
least. Plots and dwellings are used intensively 24 hours a day for
activities—ranging from cropping, raising pigs, ducks, rabbits . . .
brewing alcohol, renting rooms or beds, preparing food for sale,
sewing, hairdressing, to child caring—that all have an economic
function and produce income that can be used for consumption of
goods and services and/or investment.
“The plot’s previous owners had no formal title over the land.”
The informal land market that provided for the sale of the land
to John and Grace is ignored. The previous owners had found
themselves with peri-urban land that had appreciated with
demand. It had become more valuable to carve up and sell than to
cultivate. There was a willing seller and a willing buyer, and money
changed hands in a land market for informal rights.
“Surely they could borrow the money using the house as security.”
The article asserts that John and Grace cannot prove that they
own their house. However, they can prove that they own their
land and house; they have a contract signed by the local chief “for
a fat fee” (probably for less than the real estate, solicitor, and bank
valuation fees payable in rich countries). This contract is proof of
ownership and this is security. Other participants in the informal
land market in the village and the wider locality would view this
contract as proof of ownership. The fact that a commercial bank
may not accept it because it is not secured by the state and
guaranteed by law is a different matter, but it doesn’t undermine
their proof of ownership. All it says is that John and Grace’s
contract has insufficient value for a particular paper system that
rich countries prefer. Secondly, it asserts that the only way of
raising capital is through commercial banks. That people may have
other means is not explored. For example, without the benefits of
the banking system, John and Grace raised enough Kwacha to
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do this? They are not in debt, they don’t have a mortgage, and
they have an asset of 25,000 Kwacha. However they got the
Kwacha together in the first place, maybe they can do it again. Or
maybe they can rent out a room in their house, or build an extra
room for rental, or rent out their entire plot and house and rent a
cheaper place, the rental difference going toward the expansion
of the goat-slaughtering business. Or maybe they can get credit on
the live goats until they are slaughtered and sold. The point is that
poor people do have ways of accessing capital outside of the formal
system and they do make investments in land “they cannot prove
they own.” How else would they have accumulated the recently
revealed “staggering value” of their assets?
“It is an expression of traditional law, which is usually unwritten,
unpredictable and dependent on the chief’s whim.”
The statement asserts that traditional law is negative because
it is unwritten, unpredictable, and dependent on a chief’s whims
and, by implication, that de jure law is written, predictable, and
knowable. In reality practice is seldom traditional (“tradition” being
the creation and re-creation of colonial administrations and
administrative chiefs to define and fit practices into the new legal
forms) and has seldom remained unchanged. What is asserted as
traditional has always been fluid and changing, but this is not to
say it is unpredictable. One way change occurs is that actors draw
down elements of the de jure or modern into tradition, thus creating
hybrid practices that make local sense of evolving changes. The
writing and signing of contracts (formalising) for exchanges of
untitled land is a case in point. Moreover, the poor do have agency,
they act in given situations; they are not passively waiting for
modernization to happen to them.
“All rich industrialized countries have secure property rights.”
Again, there is a clear sharpening of difference by the use of
inclusion and exclusion: “all rich countries,” “no poor country.”
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nasty. Everyone, including family, neighbors, the village chief, and
the administration, is out to cheat you, deny you help, act
unpredictably, grab your land, and so on. But, miraculously, all
that will change when land is titled, the assertion being that the
adoption of the new instruments of governance will change
conduct from being immature (willful) to mature (based on
reason). Moreover, bureaucracies that are currently riddled with
jurisdictional overlaps and internal conflicts can be trusted to enact
fair land laws, set up transparent and accountable land-
administration institutions, and adjudicate fairly when dual or
conflicting interests in land are exposed. In discussing the
importance of legalizing informal settlements, the author has
completely failed to question the nature of the legal system that
generated illegality in the first place. It is implied that when poor
countries recognize that good property laws “clearly make a
difference,” they rarely succeed due to the resistance of people
protecting their own interests, an irrational and unprogressive claim
to the status quo. That property relations are evolving all the time
as people adapt to new circumstances, increased pressure on land,
new market opportunities, new forms of local administration, new
regulations, and so on, are denied.
“The challenge for governments in poor countries is to take that
information and form it into a clear and enforceable set of laws.
The alternative is to stay poor.”
In conclusion, the author asserts that there is no other choice:
adopt the obvious solution or stay poor. But let us ask some
questions anyway. If “people know exactly who owns what,” what
is the added value of a piece of paper for what everyone already
knows? Why invite government intervention in local land relations
for a piece of paper? What everyone may know is that property
rights can be ambiguous and subject to ongoing interpretations.
The choices are not as “sharp-edged” as the author asserts. Legally
sanctioned forms of ownership do not necessarily mean absolute
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rich or poor countries, are perennial sites of struggle.
The story “No title” manifests at least a hundred years of contest
over land and governance. Why? First, because the author both
claims and imposes “is”—how it is in poor countries, what is the
nature of land holding, what is tradition, etc. Second, the author
claims a what “ought to be”—an idealized situation that represents
the what “is” for rich countries. Thirdly, the author presumes that
if the “is” of poor countries is transformed into the “ought,” poverty
will be alleviated and, opportunities will come. Stability will prevail;
development will have occurred. In this way I claim that “No title”
is a contemporary manifestation of what my research suggests has
occurred for the past 100 years in Uganda. Moreover, I argue that
accounts such as “No title,” and more generally normative
discourses, are powerful because they generate persuasive realities
by which readers come to know the truth about things, in this
instance land relations and administration in poor countries.
I will now turn to the key events in Uganda’s history that shaped
contemporary de jure law and de facto practice (the informal), with
an emphasis on mailo land1 (freehold) in Buganda.2 This will be
followed by an examination of the main features of the Land Act
of 1998 and its mandate to regulate formally recognized dual rights
in land.
DEVELOPMENT OF INFORMAL LAND PRACTICES
IN UGANDA
1900 Agreement
The 1900 Agreement between the British and Baganda fixed
Buganda’s once fluid boundaries, established the institutions
needed for indirect rule and formulated a land settlement. The
1 Baganda rendering of the English word “mile.” Square miles of land allocated in freehold
title under the 1900 Agreement.
2 The Buganda Kingdom was the most powerful in what became Uganda and controlled
the most fertile land areas around Lake Victoria. The capital of the Buganda Kingdom
was located in what became Uganda’s capital city—Kampala.
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family, regents, ministers, and chiefs, specified amounts of land to
be held in freehold title. The remaining land in Buganda was vested
in the British Crown. The 1900 Agreement transformed the
Kabakaship into a constitutional monarchy when it created the
Lukiiko (Buganda Parliament) and filled it with bakungu chiefs—
the new landowners. Over time the prevailing Baganda land
practices underwent considerable changes as did the relations
between the Kabaka and the chiefs and the chiefs and the bakopi
(peasants) who had, prior to 1900, given envujjo (tribute) for the
use of land and the chiefs’ protection.
British support of indirect rule sprang from the belief that it
was cheaper to grant administrative powers to a local tribe who
could control agricultural production and wrest labor, taxes, and
provisions from reluctant subjects than to attempt it through direct
intervention. This act of governing, or power sharing through native
authorities, required the management of the bakopi and the control
of land, the key agricultural resource. In the early 1900s, it suited
both the Protectorate Government and the chiefs to limit the
number of large landowners so that those without land (title) would
be available as followers, who would work under conditions set
by the landowners, and on crops (e.g., cotton) governed by the
economic objectives of the Protectorate Government. This
imperative underpinned the creation of the “peasant cultivator,”
which in return required the subordination of existing social
relations and rules on land, even though the chiefs initially tried to
fit the new patterns of land ownership and tenancy into ideas and
social relations that were important to Buganda (Hanson 1997).
The provision of mailo (freehold title) for a select few in Buganda
was soon under pressure. Even before land allocations had been
completed, the number of allottees had risen from the 1000 referred
to in the 1900 Agreement to 4138 in 1921. Mailo was made
especially attractive by the special privileges it carried: the right to
be involved in Buganda politics, freedom from tax, and exemption
from community labor. Moreover, there was a growing realization
PORTER : Questioning de Soto      213that land ownership carried financial power, which was distinct
from the old nexus of land/rule/status. Having created a tradable
asset through mailo, the Protectorate Government wanted to
discourage the market in land that was emerging—both from
demand for titled land from disgruntled tenants and landowners’
desire to sell parts of their large estates—as this would undermine
national prosperity and stability. The contradictory interests of the
Protectorate Government and the mailo landowners became
increasingly apparent during the 1920s, a period of high labor
demand and high world cotton prices. Increased taxes, imposed
by the Protectorate Government, were passed directly to tenants;
landlords were increasingly viewed as a group interested only in
their own economic welfare and the bakopi tenants as a group
requiring protection from “rampant landlord exploitation.”
1928 Busuulu and Envujjo Law
In 1928 the Busuulu and Envujjo Law was passed after much
debate about customary practices and served to reaffirm the
Protectorate Government’s commitment to the ideal of the “peasant
cultivator” by securing hereditary use rights without the right of
disposal. The Busuulu and Envujjo Law ruled that peasant tenants
could not be forced off their holdings without a court hearing.
Their tenancy could be passed on to the next generation although
it could not be divided among heirs and could not be transferred,
sublet or sold. In return, the tenant was obliged to pay a set annual
fee (busuulu) for the use of the land and tribute on produce (envujjo)
for crops such as cotton and coffee. Another important change
was that the right of eviction was transferred from the landowner
to the courts. The landlord-tenant relationship would no longer
depend on custom for regulation. The courts were to intervene
despite the fact that the Busuulu and Envujjo Law was itself a legal
intervention to prop up the so-called customary feudal relations
on land. What the Protectorate Government failed to see was that
they had constructed a customary model (with the assistance of
the self-interested landowning chiefs) to account for past land
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determining behavior. This was a classic example of constructing
what “is” to justify what “ought to be,” backed by the formality of
law and power of the court. Instead, land practices moved further
and further away from the new de jure law. De jure law did not
result in the desired monopoly on regulation and control of
transactions in land.
The manufacture of the colonial ideal, the peasant cultivator
with secure tenancy rights, did not stop the commercialization of
land. Official colonial land policy retained the ideal of peasant
producers, with security-of-use rights but without marketable title,
until around 1955. However, this policy ideal ignored the increasing
financial independence of tenants and their development of a
fledging market in bibanja.3 In earlier landlord-tenant relations, if
the holder of a kibanja moved to another location the kibanja reverted
to the landowner. Sometimes, however, tenants would secretly sell
their kibanja and tell the landowner that a relative was looking
after it in their absence. When landowners realized this deception,
they began demanding kanzu (entry money) from whoever entered
the kibanja. One intention of the Busuulu and Envujjo Law was to
discourage tenants from sub-letting or selling their bibanja in line
with official policy to preserve traditional peasant producers with
secure-use rights. However, rather than stopping this practice, the
new law gave it another twist as the practice of charging kanzu
was expanded and the fledging market in bibanja grew. Once kanzu
had been paid to enter bibanja, holders believed their rights to the
land could be transferred or sold. While such transactions started
clandestinely, being strictly illegal under the 1928 Law, it wasn’t
long before a de facto practice was established that permitted the
sale of bibanja subject to the landowner’s approval of the intended
buyer. In effect, bibanja holders had taken control of the market in
bibanja transactions; they became the buyers and sellers of bibanja
with landlords mediating the market through the charging of kanzu
3Plural of kibanja—a plot of land where the occupant has use rights (usufruct).
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between landlords and tenants had shifted.
1962 Independence
The immediate pre-Independence period was one of intense
contest between the Baganda and other factions, whether based
on tribal, religious, or other affiliations. By 1955 it was clear that
an independent unitary government was unacceptable to the
Baganda and that, unless the British protected their political,
economic, and social privilege, they would cause the Independence
process to collapse. With no easy way of escaping the remnants of
indirect rule, the Munster Commission proposed a confusing and
ultimately short-lived solution: a “single, democratic state with a
strong, central government” that was federated with the Buganda
Kingdom “with more powers that it had hitherto” (Ovonji 1990,
cited in Oloka-Onyango 1995, p. 157). In 1962, amidst the fanfare
of the Independence celebrations, Uganda was given external
recognition as a Western-style democracy, but internally the state
had little legitimacy.
Negotiations between the British government and the Baganda
on changes to occur at independence resolved that the 9000 square
miles of land taken from Buganda under the 1900 Agreement and
named Crown Land would be returned to Buganda for vesting in
the newly established Buganda Land Board (BLB). Additionally,
the Baganda delegates to the Constitutional Conference in London
won guarantees that there would be no laws altering land tenure
in Buganda without the consent of the Lukiiko. Having secured
their land interests against the future independent Ugandan
government, the Buganda turned their attention to the forthcoming
elections.
When entry into national party politics became inevitable for
the Buganda, the Kabaka Yekka (“king alone” or KY) political party
was founded. After much party politicking, an alliance was formed
between Obote’s Uganda People’s Congress (UPC) and the Kabaka
Yekka; both parties needed the support of the other to ensure victory
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alliance was formed on the belief that the UPC would not meddle
with the land arrangements Buganda had secured with the 1961
Buganda Agreement. Uganda gained independence in October
1962, and a federated government of the UPC and Kabaka Yekka
took control with Milton Obote as Prime Minister and Kabaka
Mutesa as President.
Under the Public Lands Ordinance, Crown Land outside
Buganda was changed to public land under the control of the
Uganda Land Commission (ULC) and District Land Boards.4 The
alliance between the parties eventually foundered over a land issue:
that of the so-called “lost counties” of Buyuga and Bugangazi.5 In
1964, President Kabaka Mutesa refused to sign into law both the
bill authorizing the referendum and the subsequent bill to effect
the transfer of the counties to Bunyoro in January 1965. This issue
was not the only point of contest over land control. The UPC
wanted to undermine the power of the Kabaka Yekka and its
membership of landowners. One way of achieving this objective
was to change mailo land from freehold to leasehold, so that the
Uganda state owned the land. Obote never achieved this
transformation; eventually it was Amin who converted all land to
leasehold. Regardless, the alliance was broken over the promises
made to the Kabaka Yekka about non-interference with Buganda
land.
During the so-called “Constitutional Crisis” of 1966, Obote
overturned the 1962 Independence Constitution and assumed all
4 While the colonial administration had used land to secure compliance from chiefs, the
Obote Government used land for patronage. The beneficiaries were the influential political
appointees on the land boards. Land, including common land was taken and enclosed for
ranching all over the country (Kabwegyere 1975).
5 The Protectorate Government had previously given these two Bunyoro counties to Buganda
as a reward for their assistance in quelling unrest in the area. The 1962 Constitution
required a referendum to decide whether the administration of the counties stayed with
Buganda or returned to Bunyoro. In 1964, the people in the ‘lost counties’ voted to become
part of Bunyoro in the District of Kibale. However the Banyoro remained tenants of
absentee Baganda mailo landlords. Only ownership of official mailo estates changed
hands from Baganda to Bunyoro chiefs.
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the economic and political power of Baganda chiefs by eliminating
all official (but not private) mailo estates. The dispute led to
insurrection and inter alia to the passage of the Public Land (Rents
and Profits) Act, 1966. This Act was concerned primarily with the
details of the disposal of the expropriated official mailo land (West
1972, p. 95-96). Buganda’s defiance culminated in a Lukiiko
resolution demanding that the central Government remove itself
from Buganda soil. Obote responded with a military takeover of
the Kabaka’s palace, led by Major-General Idi Amin Dada, and
the proclamation of a state of emergency in Buganda. Kabaka
Mutesa escaped the attack and went into exile in the United
Kingdom. The 1967 Constitution replaced the complex unitary and
federated form of government of the 1962 Constitution with a
unitary central government. It abolished the Buganda kingdom
and vested the land held by the BLB in the ULC. Concurrently,
Land Boards throughout the country were abandoned and powers
were centralized and land vested in the ULC.
1975 Land Reform Decree
Popular discontent with Obote in Buganda, army grievances,
and a deteriorating relationship with Amin all had a role to play
in the 1971 coup staged by Idi Amin. The coup was initially greeted
with a high level of acceptance. However, to the disappointment
of the Baganda, it wasn’t long before Amin reaffirmed his
commitment to a unitary republican state. This evolved into the
need for unitary land laws and the pronouncement of the Land
Reform Decree (LRD) in 1975. The LRD held that all land formerly
in private individual tenure, such as mailo and freeholds, was to
be converted to 99-year leases, with 199-year leases for charitable
and religious institutions. The leases were to be granted by the
state through the ULC. The LRD repealed the Busuulu and Envujjo
Law; tenants on mailo and freehold land became tenants at
sufferance. Whatever Amin’s motives were, he did what Obote
had threatened to do—he vested all power over land regulation in
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everyday management of land. Clearly, the LRD made tremendous
changes in de jure law. However, the impact on de facto practice
was less significant. The inability of governments to implement
and administer the laws left significant gaps for the populace to
interpret and apply their own meanings to the law. People brought
their past to bear on their interpretations of the present and, in so
doing, retained a degree of continuity with past land practices.
New laws were never able to erase the past or to provide a solid
dividing line between past and present. Thus, people’s actions
reflect both a continuity with the past and a selective pulling down
of the new, a hybridization of past and present and of de jure and
de facto practices.
The ouster of Idi Amin in 1979 did not bring an end to hardship
and itinerant governance for the people of Uganda. After a
fraudulent electoral process in 1980, Milton Obote and the UPC
formed a government (Obote II) that received international
recognition based on regional, geo-political, and economic
agreements made while Obote was still in exile in Tanzania. The
British had proposed an arrangement whereby recognition of his
resumption of power would be subject to the adoption of free-
market policies based on a Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP)
and the return of all Asian and British properties that had been
expropriated under Amin.
THE MUSEVENI PERIOD
While Obote II was engaged in agreements with the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank, armed
struggle for democratic transformation in Uganda was engaged
symbolically and successfully by a political coalition led by Yoweni
Museveni that became the National Resistance Movement (NRM).6
A hostile international environment meant that the NRM had to
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6 Museveni’s National Resistance Army (NRA) became the NRM after taking power in
1986.rely predominantly on internal capacity to wage a protracted
people’s war against the Obote II regime. When Yoweni Museveni
assumed power in January 1986, he was faced with the challenge
of not merely restoring but crafting democracy in a fragmented
society while concurrently reconciling promises he had made to
his supporters with the global agreement/vision he would be
obliged to accept if he wanted financial assistance to rebuild his
shattered country.
Museveni was initially opposed to conditional support from
the IMF and World Bank but capitulated after serious economic
problems begin to arise during his government’s first year. Museveni
devalued the Uganda shilling, began civil service reform, removed
subsidies on food and other basic necessities, and promoted
privatization of state parastatals and utilities. The expansion of
the export sector as a stimulant to growth and improved foreign
exchange earning to pay back debt, another of the SAP
prescriptions, was destined to be a slower process. Investors had
to be enticed back to Uganda and, more critically, the people had
to be convinced of the necessity for new land law. From the outset,
the new land law was destined to promote individualization; pull
the de facto into the de jure; provide for some form of registration of
land rights; and promote land markets. More important was how
this modernization orthodoxy on land would square up against
the political and economic interests of the Baganda powers; the
expectations of the bibanja holders; the reality of rural subsistence
farmers; and the highly politicized urban population. Museveni
needed years and all the political savvy he could muster to be able
to answer these questions.
The 1995 Constitution
The Constituent Assembly (CA) Committee handling land issues
stressed that its recommendations were aimed at redressing the
anomalies introduced by colonialism. Its key recommendation was
to vest land in the citizens of Uganda. The Committee argued that
colonialism had taken the land away from the people and vested
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Public Land. Vesting the land in the people, in accordance with
four tenure systems—customary, freehold, mailo and leasehold—
would effectively return it to the masses, having been dispossessed
of it by the state. The decision to reinstate mailo and freehold land,
as Amaza (1998) pointed out, made a farce of the committee’s
pledge to redress past anomalies. A committee acting in accordance
with pre-established principles would have abolished mailo,
undoubtedly the worst of the past anomalies as it dispossessed the
bakopi of land.
The restoration of mailo was interpreted as a concession to the
powerful Baganda landowners, but made it difficult to address
landowner-occupant relations on mailo land. The CA was unable
to come to an agreement on this issue, and therefore decided that
it was the role of Parliament, within two years after the 1995
Constitution took effect, to enact an appropriate law to regulate
the relationship between the lawful and bona fide occupants of land
and the registered owners. Further, the law would accord
occupants acquisition of a registrable interest in land.
Consistent with vesting land in the people was the agreement
that any lease granted to a Uganda citizen out of public land could
be converted to freehold in accordance with the law to be passed
by Parliament. For the first time in Ugandan history, customary
occupation was recognized as a land tenure instead of occupation
on another form of tenure (e.g., public land) and customary tenants
being subject to the whims of those controlling that tenure.
Parliament was tasked to prepare the modalities that would
facilitate the implementation of the new directive as well as the
resolution of potential conflicts between customary tenants and
leaseholders claiming interests over the same piece of once public
land. Finally, the 1995 Constitution anticipated that land
management would be decentralized to the districts. Land not
claimed by customary occupants or not alienated in either freehold,
leasehold, or mailo tenures would be vested in District Land Boards
(DLB).
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and set the parameters for drafting the Land Bill, namely, the
transformation of all land into tradable forms of ownership. While
not stated directly as an objective, the direction is consistent with
the orthodoxy of land individualization that had been promoted
since the 1950s. Also consistent with the past was the stated need
to resolve dual interests in mailo land and the persistent inability
to agree how this should be achieved. Essentially it was a political
question. Whose rights should prevail—the landowners’ or the
occupants’—if it’s the latter, who would pay?
The Land Act of 1998 (Emphasis on Mailo Land)
The Land Act created the institutions through which rights to
land could be formalized and recorded. The Act did not create
rights to land per se; these had already been established through a
long process of de jure law and de facto practice during an era of
weak government enforcement. Traditional law, “dependent on a
chief’s whim,” made way for a modern, predictable set of rules
based on reason. Nonetheless, formal recognition of  “what
everyone knows” has produced a Land Act that is complex, subject
to interpretation and open to contest, as the following discussion
conveys.
The Land Act subjects registered owners to the rights of lawful
and bona fide occupants. A legal occupant is one who occupies
land by virtue of the repealed Busuulu and Envujjo Law of 1928,7
or who entered the land with the consent of the registered owner.
A bona fide occupant is a person who before the coming into force
of the Constitution, had occupied land unchallenged by the
registered owner for twelve years8 or more; or been settled on land
by government. Moreover, people who gained access to land from
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7 The focus here is on Buganda, however, other similar laws that were passed and abolished
in the Toro and Ankole Kingdoms.
8 The 12-year period draws on the Limitation Act. This Act provides that no action for the
recovery of land shall be brought after the expiry of 12 years from the time such right of
action arose.“tenants by occupancy” (i.e., lawful or bona fide occupants) became
“tenants by occupancy” themselves and have the same rights under
the Act as the occupants they transacted land with. This provision
effectively legitimated informal transactions in the usufruct market
that had been long practiced.
The extension of rights of occupancy to bona fide occupants
created much controversy in Buganda. Landowners claimed that
bona fide occupants were trespassers who had occupied land
without consent and were now being rewarded for their crime.
As someone said, “the bill is rewarding trespassers at the expense
of registered owners!” (New Vision, 14 May 1998). Landowners
also argued that the granting of inheritable occupancy on registered
land deprives a registered owner of his/her interest in land, thus
contravening Article 26 (2) of the Constitution, which provides
that no person shall be compulsorily deprived of property or an
interest in or right over property. The government position was
that the Constitution both guarantees a qualified right to own
property and provides for security of occupancy (New Vision, 20
May 1998).
Section 32 (9) of the Act declares that the security of tenure of
a lawful or bona fide occupant is not prejudiced by an individual’s
lack of a certificate of occupancy. In other words, the security of
occupants exists with or without the formality of a certificate. So
unless the occupant wishes to transact in the land or pledges it to
a financial institution for credit, there is no imperative to obtain a
certificate. In the view of Ben, a Kampala resident, land, whether
bibanja or titled, always appreciates so one should not put it at
risk. Ben says that land is at risk when you mortgage it with the
bank for two reasons: 1) plans for investment can become mixed
up by events, and then interest cannot be paid and all is lost; and
2) instability and corruption could mean that your title/certificate
gets lost.
If an occupant wants to acquire a certificate of occupancy, he/
she must apply to the owner for consent. The owner must inform
the Land Committee of the application and a date is set to verify
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determination is sent to both parties and, as long as there are no
rental arrears, the owner must grant consent, in the prescribed
form, to the occupant. The recorder can then issue the certificate
of occupancy. The recorder also notifies the Registrar of Titles, who
will register the certificate of occupancy as an encumbrance on
the title of the land.9 While the owner possesses the right to sell the
land title, it is encumbered and this will reduce its marketability.
In any case, Section 37 requires an owner “who wishes to sell the
reversionary interest in the land” to give the first option of purchase
to the occupant. Likewise, an occupant who “wishes to assign the
tenancy” must give the first option to the owner of the land. In
other words, first right of purchase must go to the person with
existing rights to the land.
Some landlords have complained that this requirement gives
them little protection, as the occupancy is still inheritable, thus
providing the opportunity, as in the past, of bringing in new
occupants (purchasers) disguised as relatives (New Vision, 22 July
1998).
An occupant may “assign, sub-let, or pledge, create third party
rights in, sub-divide and undertake any lawful transaction in the
respect of the occupancy” (Section 35). However, before doing so,
the occupant must have the owner’s consent to the transaction.
The owner may grant unconditional or conditional consent, or
refuse it altogether. In the case of the latter two responses, the
occupant may appeal to the Land Tribunal for a decision. No
transaction “to pass any interest in land” will be “valid and
effective” without consent. Thus, the decisions and actions of
owners and occupiers are inextricably linked. Their respective
“bundles of rights” cannot be exercised without the acquiescence
of the other. Moreover, unless the occupant deems that the benefits
of certification outweigh the time and costs of the process, then
9 This will require that the system for issuing certificates of occupation and certificates of
ownership be linked with the Registration of Titles system.
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occupant. Indeed, as Okoth-Ogendo (1998, p. 9) remarks:
(M)ight it not be better to acquire clean and unencumbered title
from somewhere else while retaining his/her privileged status
as a statutory tenant? . . . The provisions relating to the tenant
by occupancy may have rendered registered land subject to
them totally unmarketable in perpetuity.
Add to this process the protection of third-party interests
provided by Sections 28 and 40 (women, adult, children, and people
with disability), and the marketability of land is further curtailed.
Legal title was both recognized and diminished by the provision
that all tenants by occupancy were required to pay 1000 sh per
year (less than US$1) in rent to the owner, regardless of the size or
location of the land. There was little debate on urban/rural
differences when determining rental, even though a variable rent
on urban land seems reasonable, given the wider range of
commercial activities and land values. As Prime Minister Kintu
Musoke said:
This notional ground rent is to avoid the charge that people are
staying on the land free of charge as this would amount to
back-door expropriation. Furthermore . . . it should be stressed
that this relationship dating back from 1928 has never been
commercial but rather a social relationship. (New Vision, 20 May
1998)
The Prime Minister’s claim of a “social relationship” could be
debated at length. Before the early 1900s there were the mutual
obligations of chiefs and bakopi. However, despite the controlled
rent introduced by the 1928 Law, bibanja transactions became
increasingly commercial as landowners demanded kanzu. In effect
new occupants purchased bibanja and subsequently expected to
be able to sell it even though the law forbade sales. After the 1975
LRD abolished the Busuulu and Envujjo Law and mailo ownership,
there was no rent to pay and, strictly speaking, no mailo owner to
demand payment. Many occupants took this opportunity to sell,
divide, rent, or lend their bibanja without reference to the owner. If
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Minister claimed, why was it necessary for the government to
regulate it through the Land Act? Why was the social value reduced
to an economic dimension, which trivialized it by fixing a single
value, regardless of location or size, of just 1000 sh?
Legally, with the restoration of mailo tenure, the government
could not have given occupants on mailo land proprietorial rights
because the Registration of Titles Act guarantees a title.10 If mailo
owners had been deprived of a title, the government would have
been obliged to fully compensate them and to face the political
consequences. Short of compensation, the government could only
recognize dual rights to land and provide a legislative framework
in which owners and occupants could sort it out. This compromise
may well reflect the historical accretion of mailo relations—the what
“is”—but it falls short of the orthodox land policy of what “ought
to be.” Rather, the Land Act is a hybridization of local
determination and contingency and what could usefully be
appropriated from international land orthodoxy.
Uganda Summary
The Land Act formalizes many of these transactions by
recognizing legal and bona fide occupancy and the subsequent land
transactions of the (now de jure) occupants. However, as mailo
was reinstated as a tenure form in the 1995 Constitution, occupants
could not be given full proprietorial rights to mailo land. This is
because the Registration of Title Act provides a state guarantee on
titles. Landowners had to be recognized, but so did occupants.
The result is a Land Act that provides for dual rights to land. The
independence or de facto ownership wrested by occupants over
many years has been compromised by the legal reassertion of
landowner’s rights. Landowners may be heard complaining, “Who
10 The Registration of Title Act is derived from the Australian system introduced by Sir
Robert Torrens. Torrens believed that a land register should show the actual state of
ownership, rather than just provide evidence of ownership. Under this system the
government guarantees all rights shown in the land register (Hanstad 1998).
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land, or the people who have entered it without my permission?”
Yet in reality they had difficulty asserting their title rights. Now
landowners have an enforceable bundle of rights as do occupants.
The difficulty is that their respective bundles of rights cannot be
exercised without the acquiescence of the other. Securing a
certificate of occupancy and all subsequent transactions (to assign,
sublet, pledge, create third-party rights, and subdivide) can only
be conducted with the landowner’s consent. If consent is
unreasonably withheld, the occupant can take the matter to a land
tribunal. If either the landowner or the occupant wishes to sell his
bundles of rights, he must give first right of purchase to the other.
This is a different scenario from one predicated on bibanja holders
securing their tenure and being in a position to competitively sell
out their holding. Rather than sorting things out once and for all,
as President Museveni wanted, the Land Act has put fetters on
the market vis-à-vis both use rights and mailo titles subject to
occupancy. Of course, landowners and tenants could agree to buy
out the other’s interest. But how do they assess the market value?
On the one hand, there is no strong demand for encumbered land
so it could be argued that the owner’s residual rights are worth
very little. On the other hand, they are worth a lot to the occupant
who stands to gain unencumbered title rights. If the landowner
wishes to buy out the occupant, what is the market value of the
occupancy? The occupant can’t sell it without the owner’s consent,
but the owner can’t buy it without the occupant’s consent. Does
that reduce or increase its value? And what about other non-
monetary values in land that influence owners’ and occupants’
incentives and disincentives for purchase or sale?
The intention of international land policy discourse is to act on
land through governance arrangements in a way that reconfigures
each of the material, political, subjective and social dimensions of
people’s relationships with land. In conventional discourse, land
is property and contests about land revolve around conflict between
people desiring to control this resource and deny access to others.
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value and to exclude others. The multiple meanings of land found
in a country like Uganda are collapsed into a singular value, a
monetary relationship, arbitrated by the market. Of course, people
do have market relations; land is regularly transacted between
willing buyers and sellers. But convention presumes that people’s
relationships with land can be collapsed and equated with conflict
over economic value. If this proposition were to be effectively
applied, people would be less able to sustain and articulate the
plethora of political, social, and personal identities based on land
that are critical to securing and sustaining access to land.
CONCLUSION
The processes of informalization and formalization of land in
Uganda have been taking place for over 100 years. Historical
analysis points to a pulling down of de jure law into de facto practice,
in other words, a hybridization, or “in-betweeness,” of the de jure
and de facto. The Land Act of 1998 provides an administrative
framework for owners and occupants to register their interests in
land. Nonetheless, no change will be effected until the Land Act is
implemented through the decentralized structures provided for in
the Land Act. Operationalizing these institutions has proven slow
and difficult. This is not surprising, since the concept of
“decentralized administration” had received little attention prior
to the passage of Land Act. Political credibility is threatened by
financial, resource, and bureaucratic constraints and increasing
evidence of the jurisdictional overlaps and unfunded mandates
common to decentralized governance ambitions. The longer it takes
to implement the Land Act, the greater the opportunity for owners
and occupants to make their own interpretations of the law for
land transactions. For many Kampala residents the government
did not have the right to determine land relations. As one
respondent in my research said, “(As) governments come and go,
only land ownership is permanent and owners should have the
right to decide.” Another stated: “For sure the government wants
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matters in Uganda.” It did not make sense to the Baganda for
government to say it was streamlining land matters when no one
was having any trouble with the current land arrangements. He
concluded: “If one disturbs a beehive during midday sunshine he
should be ready for the consequences when the bees come out,”
implying the government was courting danger. The less visible the
Museveni Government is in implementing the Land Act, the more
comparisons with past governments inability to effect de jure law
are underscored. As Angel (2001) writes:
In my opinion, it is the popular struggle for security of tenure
through the occupation of lands, the gradual construction of
improvements on them, and the gradual accumulation of
property rights to those lands, that (have) been at the heart of
creating this enormous wealth that de Soto celebrates, yet
somehow takes as given. This process . . . has indirectly relied
on and benefited from weak governments, weak legal
frameworks, weak property registration, and weak enforcement
for its unprecedented success in accumulating the enormous
wealth so well documented by de Soto. But I very much doubt
that this could have occurred had all these countries already
possessed the West’s legal frameworks and police powers that
he so cherishes. . . . The integration of informal wealth into the
network of commercial exchange . . . is in fact already taking
place, and, in many ways, it is inevitable.
In other words “informality is as pronounced in the culture of
government as it is in the market place” and the “parallel incidence
of informality is not happenstance” (Schick 1998). Formalization
or legality, in all its guises, requires governments that enforce, and
are seen to enforce, legal and contractual rights uniformly,
predictably, and without favor. Without confidence in
government’s ability to act without fear or favor, the land and
housing assets that have been won by the poor and that are rights
inscribed in the heart, will not be offered up to formalization
processes.  This is the challenge for the Philippines, as underscored
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The Remaining Agenda.
The World Bank reports on two important programs to help
low-income groups “get access to tangible assets,” namely, the
National Shelter program (NSP) of 1986 for housing and the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) of 1988. Says
the NSP report:
Although it has involved great expenses . . . there is little evidence
that . . . the NSP made much of an impact on the housing
conditions of the poor (World Bank 2000b, p. 17).
CARP was intended to transfer the ownership of 8 million
hectares of land over 10 years, but is lagging behind schedule with
less than 60 percent of the targeted area for compulsory acquisition
redistributed after more than 10 years. Moreover, the modalities
under which land reform is supposed to take place are becoming
increasingly controversial:
First, questions have been raised as to whether the approach
may not be too centralized to allow active participation by
beneficiary communities, proper accountability, and adequate
provision of complementary services that are necessary to realize
the full productive potential of land reform projects. There is
also concern that—by reducing access to land through rental
and share-cropping—current land reform legislation may
actually reduce access to land for the poor. Finally, a lack of a
sustainable source of financing makes the program dependent
on political lobbying and congressional appropriations that
are not always guided by the needs of the poorest. (World Bank
2000b, p. 45-46)
The World Bank (2000a cited in World Bank 2000b, p. 96) has
recommended that:
A national strategy for fighting corruption in the Philippines
should focus on reducing opportunities and motivation for
corruption and should make corruption a high-risk, low-reward
activity.
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the public’s scepticism by showing clear evidence “that something
is being done to suppress corruption and that offenders are being
brought to book” (World Bank 2000b, p. 96). Moreover, the
eradication of corruption must go hand in hand with a recognition
of the social role of land in society if market oriented land reforms
that treat land purely as an economic asset are not to “displace
higher quality relations as they proceed” (Reeve 2001).
Karina Constantino-David (2001, p. 232) describes
development in the Philippines as “parasitic” in that it excludes
the poor in a blind pursuit of economic growth through global
competitiveness and foreign investment, resulting in a deteriorating
quality of life among Filipinos. She identifies five distinct but
overlapping power groups—the state, business, the dominant
church, the media, and international aid agencies—that share
responsibility for the present situation. Attention to the form and
process of development is critical, as Reeve (2001) poignantly
argues:
De Soto nowhere betrays any awareness that if all of the assets
he describes as readily capitalizable in the Third World were
capitalized, and nothing more, they would all be owned with
newly formalized certainty by agencies of the First World in
less than a decade. To every extent the resources of the Third
World are made monetizable and exchangeable for money, the
First World will yet have much more money and a much greater
capacity to create money and can thus buy them all and own
them as formally as you please.
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